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ABSTRACT
This paper suggests two generalizations of the deposit-refund idea.  In the first, we apply the idea
not just to solid waste materials, but to any waste from production or consumption – including wastes that
may be solid, gaseous, or liquid.  Using a simple general equilibrium model, we derive the optimal
combination of a tax on a purchased commodity and subsidy to a “clean” activity (such as emission
abatement, recycling, or disposal in a sanitary landfill).  This “two-part instrument” is equivalent to a
Pigovian tax on the “dirty” activity (such as emissions, dumping, or litter).  In the second generalization, we
consider the case where government must use distorting taxes on labor and capital incomes.  To help meet
the revenue requirement, would the optimal deposit be raised and the refund reduced?  We derive the
second-best revenue-raising DRS or two-part instrument to answer that question.  
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  For most pollutants, the standard response of economists since Arthur Pigou (1920) is to 
tax the offending activity.  A direct tax is not easy to impose on dumping or litter, however, so a 
useful alternative is the deposit refund system (DRS).  The tax paid upon purchase is refunded on 
items not dumped, so the result can be equivalent to a tax on dumping.  Around the world, DRS 
systems have applied to beverage containers, used motor oil, batteries, and car hulks. 
  In this note, we suggest two important generalizations of the deposit-refund idea.  In the 
first generalization, we apply the idea not just to solid waste materials such as those listed above, 
but to any waste from production or consumption -- including wastes that may be solid, gaseous, 
or liquid.  Using a simple general equilibrium model, we derive the optimal combination of a tax 
on a purchased commodity and subsidy to a “clean” activity (such as emission abatement, 
recycling, or disposal in a sanitary landfill).
1  This “two-part instrument” is equivalent to a 
Pigovian tax on the “dirty” activity (such as emissions, dumping, or litter).  Moreover, the tax 
and subsidy do not need to apply to the same commodity; they do not need to apply at the same 
rate; and they are not necessarily paid and received on the same side of the market. 
  In the second generalization, we consider the case where government must use distorting 
taxes on labor and capital incomes.  To help meet the revenue requirement, would the optimal 
deposit be raised and the refund reduced?  We derive the second-best revenue-raising DRS or 
two-part instrument to answer that question. 
I. The Two-Part Instrument 
Consider  n  identical consumers with utility  u(c, d, h, G, D) defined over per-capita 
consumption of a clean good  c,  dirty good  d,  home-produced good  h,  the total amount of a 
government-provided public good  G,  and total waste  D  (where  D=nd).
2  Each individual has 
one unit of resources  r  (such as labor, capital, and land) that can be used at home to produce   -2-
one unit of  h  or sold in the market to buy one unit of  c  or  d.  All prices are one.  If  tr  is  
defined as the tax on market sale of resources, then the individual budget constraint is  (1-h)(1-tr) 
= c(1+tc) + d(1+td). 
In order to describe three interpretations of our results below, we rewrite the utility 
function as  u(q(c, d), h, G, D).  Obviously, then, one interpretation is that  q  is a subutility 
function, where  c  and  d  are separable in utility.  This separability does not affect the nature of 
our results below, but it makes them easier to express and interpret.  In this first case,  d  is a 
consumer good with fixed pollution per unit (either from production or from consumption of it). 
A second interpretation is that  q  is a single consumption good, where the technology of 
disposal can be represented by  q(c, d).  In this case,  c  represents the amount of clean disposal 
such as recycling or sanitary landfill, while  d  is dirty disposal such as dumping or litter.  The 
function  q(c, d)  shows the combinations of  c  and  d  that are consistent with any particular 
level of  consumption  q.  Individuals do not get utility from either type of disposal per se, but 
q(c, d)  can be substituted into utility to get  u  as a function of  c  and  d  as above.  In this case, a 
tax  tq  can be collected per unit of  q  (but note that  tq  on all consumption makes  tr  redundant). 
  A third interpretation is that  q = q(c, d)  is a constant-returns-to-scale production 
function.  Competitive agents produce per-capita output  q  using two inputs.  The clean input  c  
includes labor, capital, or other resources.  The dirty input is emissions (which may be solid, 
gaseous, or liquid).  Emissions are needed to produce, but successive units are less crucial, so 
emissions have positive and declining marginal product  qd  (” ¶q/¶d).   A unit of emissions is 
the amount with private cost of a dollar, but note that social costs exceed this private cost.  The 
resource constraint is still  1=c+d+h.  Taxes might apply to inputs or to output. 
All of these interpretations follow from the same model.  By comparing the social 
planner’s first order conditions to the market’s first order conditions, the method described in   -3-
William Baumol and Wallace Oates (1988) can easily be used to show that the first-best optimal 
solution of Pigou (1920) is a tax per unit of the dirty good: 
 
tq = 0      tc = 0      td  = -nuD/l          (1) 
 
where  uD ” ¶u/¶D,  and  l  is the marginal utility of income.  The tax  td  is “marginal external 
damages” (MED), the sum of all  n  individual losses (uD), converted into dollars when divided 
by  l.  Since  uD  is negative, the tax is positive.   
Already the three interpretations are useful, to point out that this solution requires a tax 
specifically on the dirty activity.  If  d  is a consumption good, and pollution is fixed per unit, 
then the Pigovian tax can easily be collected upon purchase, like an ordinary excise tax.  
Examples might include cigarettes or gasoline, where consumption of the commodity creates 
negative externalities.  In the second interpretation, however,  d  is not purchased on the market.   
The tax is not on all disposal, but on dirty disposal such as dumping.  The Pigovian tax may not 
be feasible.  In the third interpretation, clean inputs such as labor and other resources are 
purchased in observable market transactions, with invoices that the authorities can use to help 
enforce any tax.  But  “emissions” are not purchased on the market.  They are necessary for 
production, but may be difficult to observe. 
The Pigovian tax may still be feasible for sulfur dioxide emissions of large electric power 
plants that are required to use expensive continuous emissions monitoring (CEM) equipment.  
Also, carbon emissions might be estimated accurately by the carbon content of fossil fuels 
purchased in market transactions.  But many other kinds of emissions are hard to monitor.  For 
any operation other than large power plants, CEM equipment might be too expensive.  A tax on 
hazardous chemical wastes can be evaded by midnight dumping, and it cannot be approximated 
accurately by taxes on purchased chemical inputs (since those taxes would not provide incentive   -4-
to reduce the waste by-product per unit of chemical input).  For households, a tax collected on all 
non-recycled waste would provide a powerful incentive to recycle as much waste as possible, but 
also to burn or dump the rest of it (Fullerton and Thomas Kinnaman, 1995). 
Fortunately, the same model can be used, as in Fullerton and Wolverton (1999), to show 
that the exact same optimal outcome can be achieved without a tax on emissions or dumping: 
 
tq = (-nuD/l)(1/qd)      tc =  (nuD/l)(qc/qd)      td = 0      (2) 
 
When  q  is a purchased commodity, it is taxed at a rate equal to the MED per unit of output, 
calculated as the marginal damage per unit of dirty input (-nuD/l) times the extra dirty input per 
unit of output (1/qd).  This “deposit” is returned only to the extent that output is produced using 
the clean input (tc < 0,  since  uD < 0).  This subsidy is the reduction in damages from using the 
clean input, calculated as the damage per unit of the dirty input times the change in the dirty 
input for a change in the clean input (qc/qd,  holding output constant along the isoquant).    
We call this solution a “two-part instrument.”  It achieves the exact same equilibrium as 
the Pigovian tax in equation (1), but it does not require measurement of emissions or dumping.  
Taxes apply only to market sale of output or purchase of inputs such as labor or capital.  In the 
first interpretation,  tq  can be replaced by an income tax  tr  (returned only on clean purchases). 
Further intuition is provided by considering two effects of the Pigovian tax,  td.  First, it 
raises the price of  d  relative to  c  and reduces pollution per unit of output through a 
“substitution effect.”   Second, it also raises the cost of production and thus the equilibrium 
output price, which reduces demand through an “output effect.”  Both effects reduce pollution.  
The same two effects are achieved by the two-part instrument.  The subsidy to  c  induces a 
substitution effect that reduces  d  per unit of output.  That subsidy alone would tend to reduce 
the equilibrium output price and increase demand, but the tax on output reverses that effect and   -5-
reduces output to the optimal degree. 
Note that the deposit and the refund are not at exactly the same rate, as they do not apply 
to the same commodity.  The tax is a normal excise tax on output, which may be paid by the 
seller or by the consumer.  The subsidy may apply to recycling or sanitary landfill, so it could be 
paid either to the household or to the waste-processing firm.  To minimize administrative costs, 
the subsidy could be paid per ton of waste at the sanitary landfill, or per ton of recycled material 
such as aluminum or glass.  In competitive equilibrium, this subsidy would be passed through 
market prices to consumers.  In other words, for the recycling firm to receive more subsidy, it 
would be willing to offer inducements to consumers such as free collection of recyclable waste.  
Individuals have no need to stand in line for the 10¢ refund. 
  Most importantly, this DRS applies not just to solid waste but to all industrial emissions.  
The model here is abstract, but the general idea is that government can subsidize pollution 
abatement -- just as the lobbying efforts of firms would suggest.  That subsidy would tend to 
reduce output price and induce more consumption of the polluting good, however, so the subsidy 
must be accompanied by a tax on output.  The revenue from the output tax can be used to 
subsidize purchases of low-sulfur coal, scrubbers, and other pollution control equipment.
3  In 
fact, since the two-part instrument is equivalent to the Pigovian tax, the output tax revenue must 
exceed the abatement subsidy by exactly the amount of revenue that would have been collected 
by the Pigovian tax. 
II. The Revenue-Raising Two-Part Instrument 
  The economics literature has analyzed deposit-refund systems,
4 but not how the rate of 
deposit or refund would optimally be modified to raise revenue when lump sum taxes are not 
available and government uses distorting taxes on labor and capital.  We just showed that our 
two-part instrument is equivalent to a tax on pollution, however, and the economics literature   -6-
certainly has analyzed how the Pigovian tax would be modified with a prior distorting labor tax.
5  
A. Lans Bovenberg and Frederick van der Ploeg (1994) have shown that the second-best 
pollution tax is marginal environmental damages (MED) divided by the marginal cost of funds 
(MCF).  Distorting taxes mean than the MCF is more than one, so the second-best pollution tax 
is reduced from MED to MED/MCF.  Fullerton (1997) and Ronnie Sch‘b (1997) show how this 
result depends on the normalization.  Specifically, Sch‘b (1997) derives the second-best tax on 
the dirty good with prior distorting taxes on labor or on the clean good. 
We now extend that analysis to the case with no tax on the dirty good or input: how is the 
deposit (tr  or  tq) and the refund  (tc)  modified when the government needs more revenue than 
can be obtained through lump sum taxation?  Would the deposit be raised and the refund reduced 
to save funds?  Fullerton and Wolverton (1999) use an optimal tax model like that of Sch‘b 
(1997) to find the second-best ad valorem tax rates (proportional to the consumer price): 
 
  tc/(1+tc)  =  - MED/MCF              (3a) 
 
  tr/(1-tr) =  MED/MCF + R              (3b) 
 
where  R  is a Ramsey term that depends on revenue needs.
6  In this normalization, an increase in 
government revenue requirements would directly raise  R  and thus  tr .  The higher distorting 
income tax would raise the marginal cost of funds (MCF) and thus reduce the subsidy  tc.  In 
other words, this answer to the question above is yes: increased revenue needs would imply both 
a higher tax  tr  and lower subsidy  tc. 
  On the other hand, not all of the income tax is really a “deposit.”  Without the pollution 
problem, the MED would be zero and the income tax would be based solely on revenue needs 
(R).  The introduction of a pollution problem introduces the need for a policy such as a pollution 
tax (at rate MED/MCF) or a deposit-refund system (which adds MED/MCF to the income tax   -7-
and returns the same amount through a subsidy to the clean good).  Thus we might say that the 
“deposit” is only the first term in equation (3b) for the income tax rate.  Using this terminology, 
the answer to the question above is no: increased revenue needs would increase the income tax 
rate, which raises the marginal cost of funds (MCF), but that means a reduction in both the 
refund and the deposit (MED/MCF). 
  It may seem surprising that the need for extra revenue implies a lower deposit, but the 
reason is the same as the reason that the need for extra revenue implies a lower tax on pollution.  
As discussed Fullerton (1997), the higher income tax itself acts like a higher tax on all 
consumption (both  c  and  d), which reduces the demand for both goods in favor of leisure.  
Thus the income tax itself helps reduce pollution, and optimality requires a smaller additional 
pollution tax (or deposit-refund system). 
III. Final Remarks 
  In general, the effects of a pollution tax can be matched by a two-part instrument with a 
tax on output and a subsidy to all inputs other than emissions.  We now discuss a few caveats.  
First of all, the subsidy to clean activities may have problems of implementation.  Policymakers 
may find it difficult to identify and subsidize all such inputs.  A partial response is that all such 
inputs earn a return that is subject to the income tax, and so this “subsidy” may really just 
amount to a lower rate of income tax.  If so, it would not involve any special forms for 
administration.  With multiple sectors, however, the lower rate of tax on clean inputs would only 
apply in the polluting sector (the output of which is subject to an extra excise tax). 
  Second, if the subsidy for recycling or proper disposal in the sanitary landfill is high 
enough, it might induce some individuals to steal waste from others in order to obtain the 
subsidy.  Again we have only a partial response, as the two-part instrument may work only in 
particular favorable circumstances.  It may work best where the subsidy is implicit, such as the   -8-
free collection of curbside garbage and recycling.  Remember, the point of the two-part 
instrument is to avoid midnight dumping, and the free collection of waste is enough to do that. 
  Third, a problem arises if a particular industry generates variable amounts of two or more 
pollutants with different marginal environmental damages.  The only way to achieve all the right 
relative prices in this case would be to tax output at a rate based on damages of the worst 
pollutant.  That deposit would then be fully returned on all clean inputs and partially returned on 
other pollutants (at a rate equal to the difference in damages).  That solution means providing a 
subsidy to any emissions that are less damaging than the worst emissions. 
  Fourth, although we have inadequate space for discussion, another problem arises for an 
open economy.  The deposit would have to be collected on imports, and the refund may not be 
received on exports.  Other problems are worth further investigation, as well. 
Finally, we note that this two-part instrument need not appear to be a unified deposit-
refund system (DRS).  The deposit may be hidden within the income tax, where individuals see 
only the total rate of tax (as in equation 3b).  The only apparent pollution policy may be a 
subsidy for clean activities: sanitary landfill disposal, recycling, or pollution control equipment.  
If that subsidy is financed by a somewhat-higher income tax rate, then the result is an implicit 
DRS.  For example, municipalities collect a sales tax and use some of the revenue to pay for free 
curbside garbage and recycling collection.  The Federal government imposes an income tax and 
provides a tax credit or accelerated depreciation for pollution abatement equipment.  The 
optimality of such schemes may depend primarily on the degree of targeting:  if the pollution is 
generated only by one industry, then the deposit would optimally appear within that industry’s 
output tax and not within the general income tax.   -9-
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1 Similar ideas appear in Gunnar Eskeland and Shantayanan Devarajan (1996), Don Fullerton 
(1997), Margaret Walls and Karen Palmer (1997), and Fullerton and Ann Wolverton (1999). 
2 In the first-best model, government has a lump sum head tax to finance the public good. 
3 This subsidy is not a payment per unit of pollution reduced (which would raise the cost of 
pollution by the subsidy forgone and thus raise the cost of production).  Instead, it is a subsidy to 
clean inputs, which would reduce the cost of production. 
4 See, for examples, Peter Bohm (1981) or Fullerton and Kinnaman (1995). 
5 For a review of this literature, see Lawrence Goulder (1995). 
6 Specifically,  R = (c/scr)(1-P)/(1-tr), where  scr  is the compensated cross-price effect on  c  from 
a change in the price of leisure (the net wage or return on resources, 1-tr), and where  P  is the net 
social marginal utility of household income (including the value of the extra private utility and 
the social value of the extra tax revenue collected). 